To what extent was Deng Xiaoping successful in reconciling a communist political vision with capitalist economic practices?

To what extent was Deng Xiaoping successful in reconciling a communist political vision with capitalist economic practices?

The two main sources used by this investigation are Immanuel Hsü’s ‘The Rise of Modern China’ (specifically Part 7: China after Mao) and Martin King Whyte’s essay ‘China’s Post-Socialist Inequality’. The sources are distinct in their outlook. In Part 7, Hsu provides a micro survey of Deng’s actions and their immediate effects on China’s people, economy, and culture. Whyte provides a macro view of Dengist China, describing how the economy evolved through the decades. Through both sources, one can see the causes and the larger consequences of economic and political reconciliation.

DISCLAIMER: This is my HL History IA essay; it got a 7 :)

Sources

Source 1

‘The Rise of Modern China’ is of much value to a historian studying this topic. As a widely read academic document written by one of the most respected historians and sinologists in his lifetime, the source has a high level of veracity. Thus, a historian would benefit from its reliability. Since it is an academic document, its purpose is to provide an objective account of China’s development over 400 years. These strengths of origin and purpose strengthen content. The tome is incredibly elaborate, specifically in Chapter 7, where Hsu pedantically chronicles Deng’s actions, the logic of his integrated vision, and the economic consequences through statistics. The history of contemporary China is complex with myriad characters, factors, influences, and events. Hsu cuts through this complexity by presenting a detailed account of these variables in an objective, academic voice. A historian gains significant support through this.

However, despite being the 6th Edition of the text, it is from 2000. Hsu’s statistics that relate to Boluan Fanzheng only have data till the late 1980s, though a few span to the early 1990s. This is a limitation as a quantitative understanding of the long-term impact of Boluan Fanzheng is hard to obtain for a historian. Additionally, more evidence may have been uncovered post-publication, so some points may not be as well-developed as they could be. Otherwise, Hsu still covers this impact qualitatively into the late 1990s (past 1999 is not of consideration in this essay, since Deng died that year).

Source 2

Whyte’s paper shares the strengths of Hsu in origin and purpose. It was written by an academic at Harvard for academic purposes: to further the field of economic history, Asian studies, and sinology. Whyte’s specific purpose examining the rise of inequality in China following the open market reforms. Thus, a historian can trust this source with its unique perspective (compared to Hsu’s general census). Values of the content lie in the stakeholders Whyte discusses. He covers the economic developments through China’s post-Mao history, examining the actions taken in the country’s new private sector by firms and investors (a perspective that Hsu does not cover) in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The essay’s focus on inequality is also unique; it puts the effect of Dengism into perspective by looking at the people, allowing a historian a deeper understanding of the reconciliation.

The paper’s focus on inequality and its economic causes means that the cultural and political aspects are not a part of Whyte’s purpose. Further, by not covering the political roots of inequality in China, causation and consequence are not clear with Deng’s actions and the effects of Boluan Fanzheng. Another limitation of the content is the lack of clarity on the correlation between economic liberalisation and the concomitant demand for political liberalisation.

Investigation:

In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s death, and the persecution of the Gang of Four, Deng Xiaoping would usurp China’s new Chairman Hua Guofeng. With this new administration began the Boluan Fanzheng Era where Deng would try to undo the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution, introduce the Deng Xiaoping theory to supercede Maoist theories, and liberalise the economy. This section will first analyse the features of his economic policies and their consequences, his ideological efforts at reconciliation, and finally the impacts on civil society

Through political maneouvering, Deng slowly gained more support and chipped away at Hua’s foundation of alliances till it was hollow. At the end of 1978, Deng emerged as the paramount leader. Thus began the Boluan Fanzheng era, where Deng would try to undo the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution, introduce the Deng Xiaoping theory to supersede Maoist theories, and liberalise the economy. 

Under Boluan Fanzheng, leadership in China was able to stabilise the country and rehabilitate more than 3 million victims and subjects of mistrials. Focussing more on the economic aspects, the Chinese economic miracle was able to take place because of Deng Xiaoping’s strategic decisions. To do this, agriculture was de-collectivised and the CCP got rid of landlord-based class systems which had acted as barriers to employment, allowing private market systems, features, and behaviours to filter in. Most significantly, the economy opened up, allowing foreign firms to operate in China for the first time since 1955. A key feature was the addition of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) where foreign firms could set up and receive tax relief and other incentives. These SEZs were mainly along the coast of China, such as Shenzhen; consequently, foreign direct investment (FDIs) poured in. During the late 1980s to 1990s, economic reforms took shape through the privatisation of state-owned enterprises; by the mid-to-late 1990s, the CCP pursued aggressive efficiency by laying off millions of redundant SOE workers (from 113 million in 1995 to 41 million in 2002).

The result of these economic policies is that China’s output increased by a great margin between 1978 and 1985 and has consistently increased since then China has averaged a GDP growth rate of over 9%. Furthermore, over 800 million people have been lifted out of poverty.

Deng was successful with his economic policies. But if Deng had simply instated these changes, he would be undermining the history and legitimacy of the CCP and the People’s Republic of China. So, was he able to reconcile these new policies with the communist ideologies of the CCP and Mao? And was this reconciliation done forcefully or did a changing China accept it?

One of the key concepts introduced by Deng was his Dengist Theory. He disagreed with Mao’s emphasis on the class struggle and ‘everyone eating from the same big pot’ belief. Deng saw these beliefs are impediments to economic development. Moreover, Deng’s economic practices opposed Mao’s theories. Opening up the market, allowing for private market investment and multinational companies to set up in one’s country are the very opposites of the forced egalitarianism imposed by Mao through collectivisation and a strictly planned economy. Thus, Dengist theory subtly framed Maoist philosophies as anachronistic while still maintaining high levels of respect. Marxism-Leninism and communism were not rejected either. Rather, Deng adapted these beliefs to the economic situation of China to justify the capitalist developments in the economy making the country more socialist. This shifted the focus of the country from the strict ideals of communism to economic construction. In terms of theoretical effectiveness and how Deng was fundamentally altering the ideologies (though not necessarily the people, behaviour, and culture of the country) of China, this reconciliation was successful.

To strengthen Dengist theories in the Chinese populace, a new form of propaganda was spread to replace Mao’s legacy and his Red Book: the Four Cardinal Principles. Deng issued a document entitled On the Various Historical Issues since the Founding of the People's Republic of China in 1982. Here Deng made the famous claim that Mao was ‘seven parts good, three parts bad’, once again imputing a level of significance and reverence to him while establishing Mao’s faults. This created a gap which Deng could fill and thus reconcile through his private market reforms.

At the surface level, Deng was able to successfully coalesce opposing economic and political systems. But was this accepted by the people in China?

Many events in China point to this not being the case. The introduction of a capitalist economy meant that its effects were felt: income inequality widened, class divisions set in, and inflation rose, alienating the mass line of peasants that China and Maoism were built upon. These effects were meant to be solved by Maoist Communism. By still paying respect to the Maoist tradition and keeping its authoritarianism while actively moving in a new direction that undermined Maoism, there was a fundamental contradiction. Frustration with this contradiction materialised through protest and dissent.

The first political liberalisation protests trace back to the Democracy Wall that lasted from November 1978 to 1981, exactly mirroring the start of Deng’s market reforms. This suggests a correlation between economic liberalisation and demands for political liberalisation. Further, it shows that the consequences of Deng’s vision contributed to the perception of this contradiction. The fundamental vision already led to ideological confusion. With China’s open-door policies, as people were able to see the modern world and ‘Western liberalism’, new ideologies were catalysed.

Years into the 1980s, negative aftereffects of the economic reforms were felt. Along with inflation, there were economic crimes, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and widespread corruption. An important note that strengthens the point, is that students were not purely protesting the economic reforms. They supported the open door policies and the widening up of China; they protested for this liberalism to be introduced to all aspects of China. This shows that the country accepted parts of Dengism but could not accept its enforcing of double standards in policy by not liberalising everything. By not doing so, nepotism and favouritism ensured the children of high cadres had opportunities in the free economy while others were left behind in traditional Maoist authoritarianism, feeling the negative effects of rapid economic growth. Students demanded political liberalisation and electoral reform. Thus began a period of constant student protests through the late 1980s, culminating in the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989. The reconciliation of opposites by Deng created dissonance in China. Students protested for greater accountability, democracy, freedom of the press, and freedom of speech. Deng’s response was the massacre. 

A decade later, beginning in April 1999, enforcing contradictory policy would damage China with the Falun Gong demonstrations. China persecuted the Falun Gong to maintain state atheism, a characteristic of Maoism and Communism. Despite being a socialist state with a capitalist economy where secularism would be expected, this characteristic was still being enforced. China would receive international condemnations and allegations of genocide.

On one side, this could be considered a reconciliation. Deng merged the authoritarianism of Mao with his new economically libertarian approach. However, a country’s branches do not operate in a vacuum; there were consequences to everything that denied successful reconciliation. The impact of the reconciliation would suggest that it was not successful considering the negative response. His integrated vision meant he was enforcing unfair contradictions in policy to the detriment of the people. 

However, an analysis of Deng’s goals is required to assess whether his government was successful. It is hard to argue that the living standards of the people are the priority of an authoritarian government.

In this respect, Deng was also successful to a large (not full) extent in achieving his goals. One must consider the nature of the conflict. Tens of thousands of protests have historically taken place each year in China, but none have changed the country. The economy keeps growing. Deng has been successful in achieving his goals; it follows that his approach was successful to a large extent. 

To conclude, based on Deng’s goals, he was successful. On the other hand, a historian’s assessment that includes efficacy and justness of government policy, levels of corruption and double standards, and the state of civil society, Deng was not successful.

Reflection:

In writing this essay I learned the difficulty of obtaining reliable sources on authoritarian states and its implications on history as a subject. A characteristic of authoritarian states is censorship. This makes the research and investigation of a state, such as Maoist and Dengist China difficult. In China, the presence of the ‘chilling effect’ meant that public criticism, opposition, and attempts at exercising civil rights like freedom of speech were soused and discouraged through litigation and government threats. As a result, media coverage was biased towards the government and not a true representation of China during Boluan Fanzheng. Moreover, most historical documents (first-hand accounts, speeches, critical articles) dating back to the era are found on obscure Chinese sites; this way, even mendacious sources are hard to verify. To a historian, the combination of a lack of resources and veracity makes the search for historical truth difficult. Studies of this period of China are inevitably incomplete. For me, this emphasised the nature of history. History may be the study of the past, but practically, it is not. It is the study of past perspectives with documents, accounts, texts, archaeological evidence, and historiography. But, no amount of perspectives will be able to reconstruct a bygone era (one could argue that evidence of, for example, an official government document declaring martial law would provide an accurate picture of an era of martial law; still, it would only be accurate to the extent that it is a fact of an event and history is more than that, it studies the progression of events, what drove that progression, and what its impacts were). Perspectives have innate problems too, especially with historiographical study. Justified opinions in historiography will be accepted because history does not seek to provide an objective survey of cause and consequence in this world; but these opinions may be fuelled by unjustified personal beliefs, lived experiences, and irrational emotions. A historian using such historiography will have tainted understandings without realising. My difficulties in researching China highlighted flaws in the nature of history that are not ubiquitous (and rarely significant) but still present.

As my essay deals with big ideological themes like communism, capitalism, Dengism, and Maoism, I realised how political leaders can influence their meanings that have carried on to today. This is especially the case with the latter two terms. The mutability of language leads to a mutability of meaning. The meanings we associate with these words are influenced by history, culture, and propaganda. A historian may then unintentionally use words with cultural implications of Mao’s horrors. The inverse is possible too. A historian’s understanding of a term may be clouded by their association with the CCP or with the USSR for somebody else when they do not define the core ideology.

I was faced with another fundamental question about history when trying to conclude this investigation. What viewpoint should a historian take when assessing historical success and failure? If despot’s goals were achieved by winning a pyrrhic war, would a historian consider it a success or failure? It depends on the perspective; if a historian is investigating in a pure manner, without value judgements, according to the intentions of the enactor, then it would be successful. If a historian is using a larger criteria and considers social, political, short-term, and long-term effects, then it may not be successful. This also depends on the role of the historian, whether it should uncover universal or individual truths of the past. I lean towards the latter approach. A leader focussing solely on achieving isolated goals is often what leads to other failures unaccounted for earlier. Focussing solely on the enactor’s justifications is analogous to the leader’s mindset, ignoring other important facts. Ultimately, their relationship is more similar to cause-and-effect than opposing viewpoints; therefore, both should be considered for a balanced argument. 

Works Cited

“China Overview: Development news, research, data.” World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview. Accessed 20 July 2023.

Chubb, Andrew. “Democracy Wall, Foreign Correspondents, and Deng Xiaoping.” Pacific Affairs, vol. 89, no. 3, 2016, pg. 567-589. JSTOR. Accessed 2 November 2023.

Edelman, Bryan, and James T. Richardson. “Imposed Limitations on Freedom of Religion in China and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: A Legal Analysis of the Crackdown on the Falun Gong and Other "Evil Cults."” Journal of Church and State, vol. 67, no. 2, 2005, pgs. 243-267. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23920778. Accessed 2 November 2023.

“Four Basic Principles (1979) | Chinese Posters | Chineseposters.net.” Chinese Propaganda Posters, https://chineseposters.net/themes/four-basic-principles. Accessed 1 November 2023.

Guang, Lei. “Elusive Democracy: Conceptual Change and the Chinese Democracy Movement, 1978-79 to 1989.” 22, vol. 4, 1996, pg. 417-447. JSTOR. Accessed 2 November 2023.

Hsü, Immanuel Chung-Yueh. The Rise of Modern China. Oxford University Press, 1975. Accessed 10th July 2023.

Linquan, Wu, and Peng Fei. “1989年6月1日吴林泉、彭飞：胡耀邦同志领导平反“六十一人案”追记.” 胡耀邦史料信息网, 23 January 2008, http://www.hybsl.cn/zonghe/xinwen/2008-01-23/7141.html. Accessed 19 July 2023.

Madsen, Richard. “Understanding Falun Gong.” Current History, vol. 99, no. 638, 2000, pgs. 234-237. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/45318453. Accessed 2 November 2023.

Naughton, Barry. “Deng Xiaoping: The Economist.” The China Quarterly, no. 135, 1993, Pg. 491-514. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/654099. Accessed 10 July 2023.

Phillips, Tom. “The Cultural Revolution: all you need to know about China's political convulsion.” The Guardian, 10 May 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion. Accessed 16 July 2023.

Whyte, Martin King. “China's Post-Socialist Inequality.” China's Post-Socialist Inequality, Harvard, 2012, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/martinwhyte/files/whyte-current_history.pdf. Accessed 10 July 2023.