The Experience Machine and The Utility Monster

Robert Nozick was one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century and an extremely important figure in ethics, moral and political philosophy. He was known for his famous, National Book Award winning treatise, 'Anarchy, State, and Utopia' (I must admit, it is a very lovely sounding triple structure).

Now this essay does not concern the major themes of ASU, but rather two thought experiments that Nozick talked about in it that are both attacks on utilitarianism. I will go through them and present my interpretations and criticisms.

So, what is utilitarianism? It is a philosophy that says that the only thing we should do with our lives is maximise pleasure. Now, this isn't based on self-interest like the terrible Objectivism. Utilitarianism says that the right course of action is one that gives the most pleasure to the greatest number of people. Nozick sought to test this philosophy through his thought experiment, the Experience Machine, and see if seeking pleasure is always the right thing to do and if it is always what we always want to do.

The Experience Machine asks you to imagine that somehow, you are living in a false reality. Your brain is connected to some sort of simulated reality. This simulated reality feels exactly the same as the one we do in real life (but is this 'real' life real?). Everything is the same (I think, therefore I am? I think, therefore I am not? A Cartesian crisis!) in terms of perception and our human nature. However, life in the simulated reality compared to our actual reality is far, far, far superior. It is better in everyway. By this virtue, the greatest amount of pleasure is being given to the greatest number of people. This is the apotheosis of utilitarianism (in many ways, this thought experiment is very similar to the Matrix films).

With this established, Nozick asks would you willingly choose to live in this false reality? He posits that many would say no (and thus attempts to disprove utilitarianism). Why? Because of these points:

• "It is only because we first want to do the actions that we want the experiences of doing them."

• "Someone floating in a tank is an indeterminate blob."

• "There is no actual contact with any deeper reality, though the experience of it can be simulated."

These points ostensibly amount to, in order, we want the true experience of doing something and that somehow relates to free will, we would have no true identity, and we cannot access our true reality. You can see the reasons to not plug into the machine lie in truth. However, truth depends on the epistemological context. It depends on whose perspective you're speaking from and what knowledge the perspective is privy too. If we are in the actual, true reality, then absolutely, many - but not all - would not plug in since the pleasure would be untrue and we know it would be untrue. This is definitely some sort of human bias or socially influenced characterstic. Nobody wants that fake Rolex or that fake Louis Vuitton bag, even if the real version is equally gaudy. But some people still want the fake one since for the status. What would happen then, if the fake one became better than the real one? To a person who has been plugged in their entire life - like Neo in the Matrix, minus being accosted by Morpheus, two pills, and a choice - none of the clauses would apply. Even if it is not a morally good thing to do, the foundation for those morals do not exist to Neo. Neo knows nothing of a true reality. Neo's simulated reality is the truth. Neo knows nothing. Neo would not unplug because he does not even know he can. By that virtue, utilitarianism is the very basis of life in the simulated reality. Nozick's last clause listed above is essentially what I am saying: if the experience of actual contact with any deeper reality can be simulated and they do not have any knowledge of a deeper reality, then they would simply live their lives.

Now, I just feel this a flaw in the design of the thought experiment. One could definitely argue that Nozick is not coming from the perspective of somebody who has the choice of plugging in or not. If that choice is there - and it is only the choice that is being examined, for example if everybody in the world in actual reality has to decide and consent to plugging in - then my criticism does not really apply. Then again, if one does decide to plug in despite being guilty of opting into a simulated reality, that guilt will never have existed for the new, simulated life. Like the way everybody says they don't want to live a life full of regret when they die, even though in death a nothingness beyond nothingness that is just unimaginable exists. Regret won't matter. And this guilt of a simulated reality won't matter the moment you plug in. So what would stop some daring and perhaps morally questionable person who is unhappy with actual life from plugging in? Nozick's argument and thought experiment, in my view, depends on the that assumption that somebody would feel so guilty to choose a simulated reality that that would step the person from entering a world where it all vanishes. It depends on somebody full of probity, would value the knowledge of this guilt over being able to make it never exist. Then again, not everybody would enter the machine so Nozick's counterattack to utilitarianism doesn't have to be universal. But should it?

I think Joshua Greene's modification of this thought experiment would solve my problems, which is that in the thought experiment which is that you cannot live your entire life in the simulation. Rather, doctors must check in every decade with the patient. Then the presence of a choice is persistent and unavoidable, strenghtening the thought experiment. Still, the difference between feeling guilty and plugging in, and feeling guilty and knowing that the guilt will vanish when you plug in is very precarious.

On to the next thought experiment. I'll keep this a bit brief since this is more of a critique of thought experiments, and by that virtue, is a critique of this one, which is the Utility Monster. This is also meant to be an attack on utilitarianism but it explores the morality of living by this philosophy. The Experience Machine asks whether we should even live by this philosophy.

Nozick asks us to imagine a hypothetical creature that derives far more utility and pleasure from consuming one unit of something compared to the utility ordinary humans derive from it. It may be 50 times more, 100 times more, a 1000 times more. Based on this, the utility monster could do and consume anything and no matter what, it would outweigh the negative effects caused to those impacted. Thus, since pleasure always outweighs damage, the utility monster should be able to do anything...according to utilitarianism.

Now, the basic thought of it actually being morally wrong to have pleasure as the sole criterion and if it outweighs the damage, it is fine. But, my problem is more 'how in the world could this even happen?'. A utility monster doesn't exist. If a utility monster exists as a murderer or some really mentally ill person, then how are we quantifying pleasure and damage, and with somebody mentally ill, how far are we considering the effect of this mental illness in corrupting the truth of 'normal' pleasure and 'normal' damage?

I understand that thougth experiments make you think of far fetched situations (though the Experience Machine isn't that far fetched now with AI), but after a certain point, doesn't a thought experiment lost its effect? Thought experiments are meant to reveal fundamental truths in ourselves and philosophy by presenting our understandings of things in wildly different contexts. But when do we consider, could this even happen and if not how does it apply to my life and why should I care or think about what I would do in this situation if this situation could never happen. This definitely seems like an anti-philosophical stance. Then again, Wittgenstein is arguably my favourite philosopher.

To conclude, I simply wanted to talk about Nozick's thought experiments and potential flaws in it. Nozick's core thoughts are definitely strong, but I feel his method of explaining and proving them has some dinks in its armour. Perhaps my interpretations and I are wrong, perhaps some of my criticisms are a bit right, perhaps Nozick wasn't the right example for my arguments on the validity of thought experiments, regardless, thank you for reading.